Decepticon 威胁画像手册:APT 组织快速参考与仿真定位指南

原创2026-10-13 13:58:522,280 阅读

Decepticon 威胁画像手册:APT 组织快速参考与仿真定位指南

导读

在红队对抗仿真中,"模拟谁"决定了一切:没有明确的威胁画像,演练就会退化为任意工具的使用,而不是逼真的敌手模拟。本手册是 Decepticon 中 Soundwave 规划代理(threat-profile 技能)的 APT 组织快速参考,用于在客户要求模拟特定威胁行为者,或演练目标行业存在已知敌手时,快速选定仿真对象。读完本文,你将掌握 Decepticon 内置的 18 个 APT/eCrime 组织画像(含归属、动机、关键 TTP)、行业到威胁行为者的映射速查表、MITRE ATT&CK Group ID 对照表,以及如何把参考条目转化为可被 OPPLAN 编排器执行的 ThreatProfile 与仿真 kill chain。


定位:一张表回答"该模拟谁"

apt-groups.md 是威胁画像技能(threat-profile/SKILL.md)的参考附件。它本身不定义流程,而是为流程的两个关键决策点提供数据:

  1. 选择仿真对象:当客户点名要求某个 APT("模拟 APT29")或演练目标所属行业存在已知敌手("金融行业的 FIN7/Lazarus")时,用本手册查画像。
  2. 填充结构化字段:手册末尾的 MITRE Group ID 对照表用于回填 plan/threat-profile.json 中的 group_id;Tier 映射表用于在写画像前确定 ThreatProfile.tier。

需要注意的是:Soundwave 通过 Skillogy 加载技能正文而非兄弟参考文件,因此本手册面向人类操作者与文档读者查阅,技能本体只引用其结论(例如 emulation playbook 中注明"see the industry → actor map in ../../references/apt-groups.md")。


国家级 APT 组织画像

以下 18 个组织的画像均以"属性表 + 关键 TTP 表"的结构组织:属性表回答归属、目标、动机、复杂度与代表性事件;TTP 表给出仿真时优先对齐的 MITRE ATT&CK 技术 ID。

俄罗斯系:SVR / GRU / FSB

APT29(Cozy Bear / Nobelium / Midnight Blizzard)

Field Detail
Attribution Russia (SVR)
Targets Government, technology, think tanks, diplomatic
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable SolarWinds supply chain (2020), OAuth abuse, cloud targeting

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
T1098 Account Manipulation
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

APT29 的现代签名是"无恶意软件的云身份间谍活动":no-MFA 密码喷洒、OAuth 应用同意/令牌滥用、Golden SAML、经住宅代理的低速邮箱收集。仓库内置的 apt29 仿真 playbook 将其展开为 10 步 kill chain(recon → password spray → consent phishing → 供应链 → 令牌窃取 → 云持久化 → Golden SAML → 邮箱收集 → Sliver C2 → 低速外传),每一步都映射到具体执行代理与操作技能。

APT28(Fancy Bear / Sofacy / Strontium)

Field Detail
Attribution Russia (GRU)
Targets Government, military, media, political orgs
Motivation Espionage + disruption
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable 0-day usage, credential harvesting, election interference

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1078 Valid Accounts
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Dump
T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Sandworm(APT44 / Voodoo Bear / Telebots / Seashell Blizzard)— G0034

Field Detail
Attribution Russia (GRU Unit 74455, GTsST)
Targets Energy/utilities, ICS/OT, government, NATO-aligned (esp. Ukraine)
Motivation Disruption / sabotage + espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable 2015/2016 Ukraine grid (BlackEnergy/Industroyer), NotPetya (2017), Olympic Destroyer (2018), Industroyer2 (2022)

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell (LOLBins: vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit)
T1485 Data Destruction
T1561.002 Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
T0831 Manipulation of Control (ICS)

Sandworm 是少数以"破坏/拒止"而非"窃密"为主要动机的国家级行为者,其 playbook 会触发 ICS/OT 技能与破坏性操作的 EMERGENCY 中止触发器——这正是 emulation 路由表将其列为 "ICS/OT disruption, destructive ops, LOTL" 的原因。

Turla(Snake / Venomous Bear / Waterbug / Secret Blizzard)— G0010

Field Detail
Attribution Russia (FSB Center 16)
Targets Government, diplomatic, military, research — 50+ countries
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Snake/Uroburos implant (FBI Operation MEDUSA takedown, 2023), satellite-link C2, watering holes, hijacks other actors' infrastructure

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server (hijacked relays)
T1189 Drive-by Compromise (watering hole)
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
T1070 Indicator Removal

中国系:MSS / PRC

APT41(Winnti / Barium / Wicked Panda)

Field Detail
Attribution China (MSS-linked)
Targets Technology, gaming, healthcare, telecom
Motivation Dual: espionage + financial
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Supply chain attacks, rootkits, dual operations

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1053.005 Scheduled Task
T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

APT41 是少数同时具备"间谍 + 财务"双重动机的国家级行为者,这使它在 emulation 路由表 中被归为 "Nation-state + financial" 类型。

APT40(Leviathan / Kryptonite Panda / Gingham Typhoon / TA423)— G0065

Field Detail
Attribution China (MSS — Hainan State Security Dept.)
Targets Maritime, defense, aerospace, government, critical infrastructure (APAC + US)
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Rapid PoC weaponization (Log4Shell, ProxyShell, Confluence), compromised SOHO devices as C2 proxies, web shells

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1133 External Remote Services
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1078 Valid Accounts
T1090 Proxy (compromised SOHO devices)
T1119 Automated Collection

APT10(Stone Panda / menuPass / Cicada / Red Apollo)— G0045

Field Detail
Attribution China (MSS — Tianjin bureau)
Targets Managed service providers (MSP), aerospace, government, healthcare, telecom
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Operation Cloud Hopper (MSP supply-chain), PlugX / QuasarRAT, DLL side-loading, MSP→client pivot abusing trusted relationships

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1199 Trusted Relationship (MSP pivot)
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
T1053.005 Scheduled Task
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Volt Typhoon(Vanguard Panda / BRONZE SILHOUETTE / Insidious Taurus)— G1017

Field Detail
Attribution China (PRC state-sponsored)
Targets US critical infrastructure — communications, energy, water, transportation; pre-positioning toward OT
Motivation Espionage / pre-positioning for disruptive effect
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Living-off-the-land only (minimal malware), multi-year dwell, KV-botnet of compromised SOHO routers, edge-device exploitation

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (edge appliances)
T1078 Valid Accounts
T1059.001 PowerShell (LOTL)
T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS (ntdsutil / vssadmin)
T1070.001 Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy (SOHO router botnet)

Salt Typhoon(GhostEmperor / FamousSparrow / UNC2286)— G1045

Field Detail
Attribution China (PRC state-sponsored)
Targets Telecommunications / ISPs, lawful-intercept systems, government
Motivation Espionage (long-term collection)
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable 2024 US telecom breaches (carrier backbones), network-edge persistence, custom web shells, log tampering

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (routers / firewalls / VPN)
T1098.004 Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH
T1571 Non-Standard Port
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1070 Indicator Removal (log clearing)

朝鲜系:RGB

Lazarus Group(Hidden Cobra / ZINC)

Field Detail
Attribution North Korea (RGB)
Targets Financial, cryptocurrency, defense, media
Motivation Financial + espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable Cryptocurrency theft, watering holes, custom malware

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1059.006 Python
T1055 Process Injection
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Kimsuky(APT43 / Velvet Chollima / Emerald Sleet / THALLIUM)— G0094

Field Detail
Attribution North Korea (RGB)
Targets Think tanks, academia, nuclear / foreign-policy bodies, government, defense
Motivation Espionage (+ crypto theft to fund operations)
Sophistication High
Notable Deep target recon, impersonation of journalists/academics, CHM lures, credential harvesting, email/session theft

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1598.003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File (CHM)
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
T1114 Email Collection
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

伊朗系:MOIS

OilRig(APT34 / Helix Kitten / Cobalt Gypsy / Hazel Sandstorm)— G0049

Field Detail
Attribution Iran (MOIS)
Targets Energy / oil & gas, financial, government, telecom, chemical (Middle East)
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication Nation-state
Notable DNS-tunneling C2 specialists, custom backdoors (Helminth / QUADAGENT / Karkoff), web shells, heavy LOTL

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell
T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS
T1572 Protocol Tunneling (DNS tunneling)
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1078 Valid Accounts

MuddyWater(Mango Sandstorm / Static Kitten / Seedworm / TEMP.Zagros)— G0069

Field Detail
Attribution Iran (MOIS)
Targets Telecom, government, oil & gas, defense (Middle East); also an initial-access broker
Motivation Espionage
Sophistication High
Notable Spearphishing → legitimate RMM (Atera / ScreenConnect / SimpleHelp), PowerShell-heavy tradecraft, BugSleep backdoor

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1219 Remote Access Software (RMM abuse)
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1534 Internal Spearphishing
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging

eCrime 定向犯罪组织

FIN7(Carbanak / Navigator Group)

Field Detail
Attribution Eastern Europe (cybercriminal)
Targets Retail, hospitality, financial services
Motivation Financial
Sophistication Medium-High
Notable Point-of-sale malware, social engineering

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1053.005 Scheduled Task
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web
T1005 Data from Local System

Scattered Spider(UNC3944 / Octo Tempest / Roasted 0ktapus / Muddled Libra)— G1015

Field Detail
Attribution eCrime (native English-speaking, US/UK)
Targets Telecom, BPO/CRM, technology, gaming, hospitality, retail, financial, MSP
Motivation Financial (extortion + ransomware)
Sophistication High (social-engineering specialists)
Notable MGM/Caesars (2023), help-desk vishing, MFA fatigue, SIM-swap, ALPHV→RansomHub→DragonForce affiliate

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1656 Impersonation (help-desk / employee)
T1598 Phishing for Information (vishing / smishing)
T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation (MFA fatigue)
T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (Okta / Entra ID / AWS)
T1219 Remote Access Software (AnyDesk / LogMeIn / ConnectWise)
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

Scattered Spider 是典型的"社工专家"型 eCrime 组织,其仿真 playbook 被路由表标记为 tier-2、主打 help-desk 社工→云/SaaS→勒索的链条。


RaaS 勒索软件团伙

LockBit(RaaS)— no MITRE Group ID(tracked as software S1202)

Field Detail
Attribution eCrime — Ransomware-as-a-Service (affiliate model)
Targets Cross-sector — manufacturing, healthcare, financial, government, construction
Motivation Financial (double extortion)
Sophistication High (developer core + affiliates)
Notable Most prolific RaaS of 2022–2023; StealBit/MEGA exfil; Windows + VMware ESXi lockers; disrupted by Operation Cronos (Feb 2024)

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1133 External Remote Services (RDP / VPN)
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery (delete shadow copies)
T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (StealBit / MEGA)

ALPHV / BlackCat(RaaS)— no MITRE Group ID(tracked as software S1068)

Field Detail
Attribution eCrime — Ransomware-as-a-Service (DarkSide / BlackMatter successor)
Targets Cross-sector incl. healthcare (Change Healthcare, 2024), energy, financial
Motivation Financial (triple extortion)
Sophistication High
Notable Rust cross-platform locker (Windows / Linux / ESXi); stealer-sourced creds; Kerberoasting; AnyDesk / Splashtop / MEGAsync

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1078 Valid Accounts (stealer-sourced credentials)
T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Cl0p(TA505 / FIN11 overlap)— G0092(software S0611)

Field Detail
Attribution eCrime (TA505-linked)
Targets Mass cross-sector via managed file transfer — financial, healthcare, government, education
Motivation Financial (data-theft extortion)
Sophistication High
Notable Mass 0-day of MFT appliances (MOVEit CVE-2023-34362, GoAnywhere CVE-2023-0669, Accellion FTA, Cleo); LEMURLOOT web shell; shift to extortion-only

Key TTPs:

ID Technique
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (MFT 0-days)
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell (LEMURLOOT)
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
T1078 Valid Accounts
T1133 External Remote Services

行业 → 威胁行为者映射(演练定界速查)

当演练目标属于某个行业、但客户没有点名具体行为者时,按此表快速圈定"主威胁 + 次威胁"候选,用于 threat-profile 技能 的 Step 1 选型:

Target Industry Primary Threat Secondary Threat
Financial / banking FIN7, Lazarus (APT38) LockBit, Cl0p, ALPHV
Government / diplomatic APT29, APT28 Turla, Volt Typhoon, Kimsuky
Technology / SaaS APT41, APT29 Scattered Spider, FIN7
Healthcare / pharma ALPHV, LockBit APT41, Cl0p
Defense / aerospace APT28, APT40 Lazarus, APT10, Turla
Maritime / shipping APT40 APT41
Retail / hospitality / gaming FIN7, Scattered Spider LockBit
Cryptocurrency / DeFi Lazarus (incl. AppleJeus) Kimsuky
Energy / utilities Sandworm, OilRig APT28, Volt Typhoon
ICS / OT / critical infra Sandworm, Volt Typhoon APT40
Telecom / ISP Salt Typhoon, MuddyWater APT41, APT10
Manufacturing / industrial LockBit, ALPHV APT41
MSP / IT services / supply chain APT10, APT29 Cl0p, Scattered Spider
Education / research Cl0p, Kimsuky APT41
Think tanks / NGO / policy Kimsuky, APT29 APT28, Turla

MITRE ATT&CK Group ID 对照表(crosswalk)

该表用于回填 threat-profile.json 的 group_id 字段。被 MITRE 以 software 而非 group 跟踪的勒索团伙没有 Gxxxx 编号:此时 group_id 留空,并在 actor_name 中同时写入团伙名与软件 ID。

Actor MITRE ID Attribution Type
APT29 G0016 Russia (SVR) Nation-state espionage
APT28 G0007 Russia (GRU 26165) Nation-state espionage/disruption
Sandworm G0034 Russia (GRU 74455) Nation-state disruption/ICS
Turla G0010 Russia (FSB) Nation-state espionage
APT41 G0096 China (MSS) Nation-state + financial
APT40 G0065 China (MSS Hainan) Nation-state espionage
APT10 G0045 China (MSS Tianjin) Nation-state / supply chain
Volt Typhoon G1017 China (PRC) Nation-state / critical infra
Salt Typhoon G1045 China (PRC) Nation-state / telecom
OilRig (APT34) G0049 Iran (MOIS) Nation-state espionage
MuddyWater G0069 Iran (MOIS) Nation-state / access broker
Lazarus Group G0032 North Korea (RGB) Nation-state + financial
APT38 (BlueNoroff) G0082 North Korea (RGB) Nation-state financial
AppleJeus G1049 North Korea (RGB) Crypto theft (Lazarus umbrella)
Kimsuky (APT43) G0094 North Korea (RGB) Nation-state espionage
FIN7 G0046 eCrime Financial → ransomware (BGH)
Scattered Spider G1015 eCrime Social-engineering extortion
Cl0p (TA505) G0092 eCrime MFT mass-exploitation extortion
LockBit — (software S1202) eCrime RaaS Ransomware (affiliate)
ALPHV / BlackCat — (software S1068) eCrime RaaS Ransomware (affiliate)

Tier 映射与仿真 playbook

写画像之前,先用此表把行为者映射到 ThreatProfile.tier(枚举定义见下文源码节):

Tier Value Fits
3 tier-3 All nation-state actors above (APT29/28, Sandworm, Turla, APT41/40/10, Volt/Salt Typhoon, OilRig, MuddyWater, Lazarus, Kimsuky)
2 tier-2 Targeted eCrime (FIN7, Scattered Spider, LockBit/ALPHV/Cl0p affiliates)
1 tier-1 Opportunistic / commodity (see adversary-archetypes.md)

对于"命名行为者"场景,不要手工编排 TTP 序列,而是加载仿真目录与对应 playbook:

load_skill("/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/SKILL.md")   # 路由表
load_skill("/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/apt29/SKILL.md")  # 例如 APT29

emulation 路由表 当前收录 7 个 playbook:APT29(tier-3,云身份间谍)、Sandworm(tier-3,ICS/OT 破坏)、Scattered Spider(tier-2,社工勒索)、Volt Typhoon(tier-3,边缘设备 + LOTL)、Lazarus(tier-3,金融/加密货币窃取)、FIN7(tier-2,钓鱼→大猎物勒索)、LockBit(tier-2,通用 RaaS 附属链)。每个 playbook 提供四类产物:

  • ThreatProfile seed:可直接落入 plan/threat-profile.json 的合法 JSON;
  • Kill-chain 仿真表:phase → MITRE → 仿真动作 → 执行代理与操作技能;
  • RoE / safety gates:行为者专属授权与中止触发器(破坏型/ICS/身份接管行为者至少需要一个 EMERGENCY 触发项,写入 abort.json);
  • Deconfliction 标识:写入 deconfliction.json,便于蓝队区分演练与真实入侵。

从参考条目到 playbook 的完整用法(Soundwave Phase 2)

  1. 根据操作者的需求与现有证据选定一个主导行为者(每个演练只模拟一个主导对象);
  2. 加载叶子 playbook:load_skill("/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/<actor>/SKILL.md");
  3. 把 ThreatProfile seed 复制进 plan/threat-profile.json,然后剪除 RoE 禁止的 key_ttps / initial_access(整阶段技术被剪空的 kill-chain 行随之删除);
  4. 把 kill chain 提升进 conops.json 的 kill_chain(每个存活阶段一个 KillChainPhase),并嵌入单条 threat_actors 摘要;
  5. 把 playbook 的 安全门 带入 abort.json、deconfliction 标识带入 deconfliction.json;
  6. 移交编排器:OPPLAN-builder 读取 threat-profile.json + conops.json 构建目标 DAG,每个目标由执行代理加载对应技能。

若只需泛化的行为者类型(不针对命名 APT),则改用 adversary-archetypes.md 中的四类预置画像(tier-1 机会主义、tier-2 定向网络犯罪、tier-3 国家级、tier-4 内部威胁),复制后按演练定制。


从参考手册到可执行画像:ThreatProfile 源码深度

参考手册提供的是"人类可读的情报卡片",而 Decepticon 编排器消费的是结构化 schema。二者在 decepticon_core/types/engagement.py 中衔接:

  • ThreatTier 枚举(engagement.py#L630-L635):tier-1(机会主义)、tier-2(定向网络犯罪)、tier-3(APT/国家级)、tier-4(内部威胁)——与上文的 Tier 映射表一一对应;
  • ThreatProfile 模型(engagement.py#L638-L684):是 plan/threat-profile.json 的 schema,字段包括 engagement_name、actor_name、actor_aliases、group_id(来自 crosswalk 表)、tier、sophistication、motivation、initial_access(TA0001 技术 ID)、key_ttps(Top 5–10 技术)、tools、infrastructure、recent_cti_delta(近 12 个月 CTI 增量,自由文本)与 confidence(FindingConfidence,默认 probable)。其文档字符串明确:这是独立于 CONOPS.threat_actors 的独立 JSON,OPPLAN-builder 依据它选择 TTP 序列,操作代理依据它约束工具选择;
  • ThreatActor 旧模型(engagement.py#L354-L365):即 conops.json 中内嵌的单条摘要形态(name + sophistication + motivation + initial_access + ttps),用于向后兼容。写内嵌摘要时跳过 tier / group_id / tools / infrastructure——这些只存在于独立画像中。

threat-profile.json 并非可选的草稿:它是规划文档包的八份必需文档之一。在 complete_planning.py 中,_PLANNING_DOCUMENTS 将 threat-profile.json 绑定到 ThreatProfile 模型;validate_planning_bundle() 会对全部八份文档做 model_validate 校验,缺失、JSON 非法或 schema 不符都会直接阻塞"Planning draft ready"事件。此外所有规划文档必须共享同一个非空 engagement_name,roe.json 必须含 authorization_reference,启动器声明的目标必须精确出现在 RoE.in_scope 中——这也解释了为什么"选型→映射→RoE 剪除"必须先于画像落盘。


使用纪律

从参考手册到仿真的三条铁律,与 threat-profile 技能 及 emulation 路由表保持一致:

  1. 模拟行为,而非恶意软件:Decepticon 用自有工具(Sliver、NetExec、certipy 等)复现行为者的 TTP 与执行顺序,绝不运行行为者真实植入体;保真度来自技术顺序 + OPSEC 姿态,而非样本复用。
  2. RoE 在任何冲突中胜出:行为者的招牌动作(鱼叉钓鱼、ICS 写入、加密勒索)若未经授权,直接剪除,绝不"超范围硬模拟"。例如外部-only 演练聚焦 T1190/T1595/T1133,钓鱼授权才引入 T1566/T1598,内部假设失陷则从 T1078 起步。
  3. 每个画像一个行为者:多行为者场景只取主导仿真目标,次要行为者在 recent_cti_delta 中注明。

本手册覆盖的组织画像、G-ID 对照与行业映射均来自 apt-groups.md 及同目录的 emulation playbook,可作为每次威胁建模与演练定界的第一手检索入口。

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Decepticon